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The Early Aquinas on the Question of Universal Salvation,  
or: How a Knight May Choose Not to Ride His Horse 
 
Franklin T. Harkins 
Durham University 
 
 One of the most vexing questions of Christian theology throughout the centuries has been 
how to reconcile, or at least hold in tension, God’s benevolent will that all humans should be 
saved with the teaching—witnessed perhaps most starkly in Rom. 9 and Augustine’s doctrine of 
predestination—that all humans will not, in fact, actually attain to final salvation.  As Peter 
Lombard asks in Book I distinction 46 of his Sentences, is the will of God in this case thwarted?  
And, if so, how can it be that the will and actions of humans—created and contingent—can 
render the eternal, divine will null and void?  Here we will consider how Thomas Aquinas 
answers—or at least intelligently grapples with—these perennial questions by examining his 
exegeses of 1 Tim. 2:4, God wills that all humans should be saved, in two of his earliest works: 
the Scriptum on the Sentences and the sixth Disputed Question on Truth, both dated to the period 
1252-57.   
 In his Scriptum on Bk. I d. 40 of the Sentences, Thomas Aquinas makes use of scriptural 
authority with surprising infrequency, especially in comparison to his teacher, Albertus Magnus, 
on this distinction, even as he asks and answers very similar questions.
1
  In the midst of many 
references to Aristotle, Thomas does invoke 1 Tim. 2:4 twice in commenting on d. 40 and once 
more on d. 46.  The first of these comes in q. 1 a. 2 on d. 40, where it is asked “whether 
predestination pertains to knowledge”.  In the solution, Thomas explains that included in 
predestination is providence as it pertains particularly to humans.  As such, “predestination 
                                                          
1
 For Albert’s commentary on d. 40 of Bk. I, see B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. 26, ed. 
Augustus Borgnet (Paris, 1893), pp. 303-336. 
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brings in providence according to what has been ordained for the execution of the work [of 
God’s plan] by means of the will”.2  Predestination includes, then, not only God’s foreknowledge 
of the plan, but His volitional preparations to carry it out.  Here Thomas quotes and comments on 
1 Tim. 2:4: “God wills that all humans should be saved, although all are not saved; not according 
to the order of predestination.  For predestination is called the divine intention concerning the 
salvation of those [who will be saved] together with His foreknowledge that they will be saved.  
And therefore it is said that it [i.e., predestination] is foreknowledge and preparation”.3  Like his 
teacher, Thomas does not take 1 Tim. 2:4 to mean that every human being will be saved; quite to 
the contrary, after quoting this text, he states matter-of-factly that not all are saved according to 
divine predestination, which includes God’s will to prepare only certain individuals for salvation.  
                                                          
2
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sententiarum d. 40 q. 1 a. 2 sol., ed. R. P. Mandonnet, O.P., vol. 1 
(Paris, 1929), p. 945: . . . praedestinatio importat providentiam, secundum quod est ordinata ad 
executionem operis per voluntatem.  All subsequent references to Thomas’s Scriptum on Bk. I 
will be to the Mandonnet edition and cited according to page number(s) in vol. 1.  All 
translations will be my own. 
3
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 40 q. 1 a. 2 sol., p. 945: . . . . Deus vult omnes homines 
salvos fieri, licet non omnes salventur: non autem ab ordine praedestinationis.  Dicit enim 
praedestinatio intentionem divinam de salute istius cum praescientia ejus quod salvabitur; et 
ideo dicitur, quod est praescientia et praeparatio. 
3 
 
Unlike Albert, Thomas does not use the antecedent/consequent will distinction here in 
elucidating 1 Tim. 2:4.
4
   
 He does, however, invoke this distinction in treating this text in the Disputed Question on 
Predestination (q. 6 of his Disputed Questions On Truth), likely produced during the initial year 
of his first Paris regency, 1256-57, immediately after he completed his Sentences lectures.
5
  We 
will return to Thomas’s consideration of 1 Tim. 2:4 in a. 2 of this question.  For now, let us look 
at the opening article of q. 6, which again asks “whether predestination pertains to knowledge or 
will,” where Thomas further distinguishes between providence and predestination vis-à-vis 
God’s will.  Providence and predestination, he explains, differ in two ways.  First, providence is 
the universally applicable name for ordering to an end, and so it extends to all things that God 
orders to some end, whether they are rational or irrational, good or evil.  Predestination, by 
contrast, looks only to that end which is primary for the rational creature, namely, glory; and so it 
pertains only to humans, and more specifically to those humans who “tend toward” or “seek” 
(spectant) salvation.
6
  Second, providence and predestination differ in light of another 
distinction, which obtains wherever there is ordination to an end, namely, that between the order 
                                                          
4
 For Albert, see his treatment of the question “whether all humans are predestined, or only 
certain ones” in Commentarium in I Sententiarum (hereafter: Comm. in I Sent.) d. 40 a. 8 obj. 1 
and ad 1, in B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. 26, pp. 315-16. 
5
 On the dating and chronology of the disputed questions, see Questiones Disputatae, vol. 1: De 
veritate, ed. Raymund Spiazzi, OP (Turin: Marietti, 1948), pp. xiii-xvi.  On the date and context 
of the Sentences lectures, see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, 
Thought, and Works (Oxford, 1974), pp. 53-92. 
6
 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 113). 
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or ordering itself (ipsum ordinem) and the conclusion or result of the order (exitum vel eventum 
ordinis).  Providence concerns only the order itself toward an end; hence, by His providence God 
orders all humans to beatitude.  But predestination pertains also to the conclusion or result of the 
order; hence, it concerns only those who actually attain to glory.  Thomas’s distinction between 
providence concerning humans and predestination corresponds, then, to that between God’s 
antecedent and consequent will.  Thomas makes clear that those who are predestined and thus 
reach their beatific end do so “not principally by their own powers, but by the help of grace 
divinely given”.7   
It is here that divine election and God’s unequal love of humans enters the equation.  
Thomas may well have 1 Tim. 2:4 in mind when he explains, still in a. 1 of disputed question 6, 
that the end toward which predestination ordains is not considered universally, but rather only in 
relation to the one who reaches this end, who ought to be distinguished in the mind of the one 
directing him [namely, God] from those who do not reach that end.
8
  “And so,” Thomas teaches, 
“predestination presupposes love, by means of which God wills the salvation of some particular 
person” (per quam Deus vult salutem alicuius).9 
                                                          
7
 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 113): Sicut igitur se habet providentia 
ad impositionem ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio ad ordinis exitum vel eventum: quod enim 
aliqui finem gloriae consequuntur, non est principaliter ex propriis viribus, sed ex auxilio 
gratiae divinitus datae.  Cf. ST I-II.109.5c and 6c. 
8
 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 114). 
9
 Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 1 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 114).  
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In commenting on Bk. III d. 32 of the Sentences and again in q. 20 of the Prima Pars of 
the Summa theologiae, Thomas specifically asks “whether God loves all things equally”.10  
Interestingly, in both cases his opening objection maintains that God seems to love all things 
equally in that His providence, by which He cares for all things, is an effect of His love.
11
  In the 
Scriptum, Thomas answers the question by noting that although God inclines His will toward all 
things with an equal efficacy, He wills a greater good for some things than for others; and so, 
according to the objects loved, it can be said that God loves unequally.
12
  Similarly, in the 
Summa, Thomas distinguishes between the act of the will itself  and the good which the lover 
wills to be loved; whereas God loves all things with a single and simple act of His will, and thus 
equally, He does will a greater good for some things than others.  Indeed, since the love of God 
is the cause of the goodness of things, one thing would not be better than any other if God did 
not will a greater good for it than for another.
13
  Thomas replies to the first objection in the 
Scriptum by observing that, although God has equal concern for all things from the perspective 
of his solicitude itself, different creatures are provided for differently.
14
  In the Summa, he 
clarifies that God is said to have equal care for all things not because He manages equal goods 
with the same concern, but because He administers all things with an equal wisdom and 
goodness.
15
 
                                                          
10
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4; ST I.20.3. 
11
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4 obj. 1. 
12
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4 c. 
13
 ST I.20.3c; see also a. 4c. 
14
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 4 ad 1. 
15
 ST I.20.3 ad 1. 
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Thomas drives home several of his major points concerning salvation—namely, that 
salvation presupposes predestination, that predestination presupposes election, that election 
presupposes love, and that election itself is eternal—when, in the Scriptum on Bk. III d. 32, he 
addresses the “little question” (quaestiuncula) of “whether God loves the just person who is 
foreknown [as damned] more than the predestined sinner”.16  It seems that He does, the 
objections point out, because God loves the person who loves Him more than the one who does 
not, because the just person is a greater good than the sinner, and because the just person is a 
member of Christ.
17
  On the other hand, Thomas notes in the sed contras that God’s love is the 
cause of election and God wills a greater good for the person who is predestined, so God must 
love the elect sinner more.
18
  In order to answer the question, Thomas distinguishes between the 
eternal and the temporal and between God’s love and the object of that love.  Whereas 
“presently” (ut nunc) God loves the just person who is damned more than the predestined sinner 
(as the objections indicate), the question ought to be determined based more on the love of God, 
which is eternal and immutable, than on the temporal object loved.  And, because from eternity 
God has willed a greater good for the one who is predestined, it must be affirmed “simply” 
(simpliciter) that God loves the predestined sinner more than the damned just person.
19
                         
 If we return to the Scriptum on Bk. I, we find that Thomas asks directly in q. 1 a. 1 of d. 
46 “whether God wills that all humans should be saved”.  It is noteworthy that Thomas asks this 
question, wherein appears his most extensive treatment of 1 Tim. 2:4 in the Scriptum, not in d. 
                                                          
16
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1. 
17
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 obj. 1, 2, 3. 
18
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 sc 1, 2. 
19
 Scriptum in Sent. III d. 32 q. 1 a. 5 qc. 1 c. 
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40 or 41, as Albert had done, but in d. 46, where the Lombard himself asks, inter alia, whether 
the will of God can ever be made void and whether evil things are done by God’s will or against 
it.  It is also significant that Thomas explicitly frames the question with the words of 1 Tim. 2:4; 
indeed, the question asks, in effect, how this scriptural text should be understood.  Thomas’s 
question is doubtlessly formulated in this way on account of the fact that Peter Lombard opens 
his own discussion in d. 46 with a quotation from the Enchiridion wherein Augustine offers 1 
Tim. 2:4 and asks whether the human will actually impedes the will of God since, although God 
wills that all should be saved, in fact many are damned.
20
  It is first of all on account of the 
authority of the Apostle, Thomas maintains in his opening objection, that it seems as if God wills 
that all should be saved.
21
  Furthermore, the fourth objection explains that because every agent 
intentionally wills that his work reach its end and because God has created the human for the end 
of eternal salvation, God wills that all humans should be saved.
22
  The sed contra affirms very 
straightforwardly, in the manner of the Lombard’s quotation of Augustine, that not all humans 
actually are predestined and therefore attain to salvation, so it must not be the case that God’s 
saving will extends to all.
23
 
In determining this question, Thomas invokes John Damascene’s distinction, from On the 
Orthodox Faith II.29, between God’s antecedent and consequent will.  He makes clear, though, 
that this distinction does not reflect any diversity in the divine will itself, but rather simply “the 
                                                          
20
 Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, I d. 46 ch. 1, ed. Ignatius Brady (Rome, 
1971), vol. 1, pp. 312-13. 
21
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 obj. 1, p. 1050. 
22
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 obj. 4, p. 1050. 
23
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sed contra, pp. 1050-51. 
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different conditions of those who are willed”.24  Further, according to Thomas, in each human, as 
an object of the divine will, we can consider his nature and “other of his circumstances, such as 
that he wills and prepares himself for his salvation, or that he opposes and works contrary to 
it”.25  God does not will to save the person who opposes salvation through divine grace, 
inasmuch as God considers him precisely under such negative circumstances that are ‘additional’ 
to his nature; rather, He wills to save only those who are willing to receive divine grace and act 
in accordance with it (volens et consentiens).
26
  “And this is called [God’s] consequent will,” 
Thomas concludes, “because it presupposes foreknowledge of works not as a cause of the will 
(causam voluntatis) [of God], but as it were a reason in the one willed (rationem voliti).”27 
Thomas replies to objection one by reminding his reader of the traditional interpretive 
scope of 1 Tim. 2:4: namely, he notes that whereas Damascene maintains that these scriptural 
words refer to God’s antecedent, but not His consequent, will, Augustine teaches that they speak 
of His consequent will and can be read accordingly in two ways.  In the first way, according to 
Augustine, 1 Tim. 2:4 can be read according to “a fitting distribution” (distributio accommoda) 
                                                          
24
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051: . . . et hoc contingit non ex aliqua 
diversitate voluntatis divinae, sed propter diversas conditiones ipsius voliti. 
25
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051: Potest enim in unoquoque homine 
considerari natura ejus et aliae circumstantiae ipsius, ut quod est volens et praeparans se ad 
salutem suam, vel etiam repugnans et contrarie agens. 
26
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051. 
27
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 sol., p. 1051: . . . et hoc dicitur voluntas 
consequens, eo quod praesupponit praescientiam operum non tanquam causam voluntatis, sed 
quasi rationem voliti. 
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as applying to God’s consequent will for all humans who will, in fact, be saved.  The second way 
is to affirm that “all” in the sacred text signifies not every individual human but every nation, 
race, or kind, “because He has predestined to life some belonging to every condition of 
humankind,” Thomas observes.28  In reply to the fourth objection, that God wills that every 
human should be saved because He has created the human to attain to the end of eternal 
salvation, Thomas intimates that God’s consequent will for the salvation of only certain humans 
takes into account the other circumstances of each person beyond his or her human nature as 
created.  By way of an architectural analogy, he explains: 
A wise craftsman does not will that his work should reach its end unless according to the 
plan of the end (secundum rationem finis).  For if there is some disposition [in the work] 
that is incompatible with the form which he intends to produce, he does not produce that 
form in it, unless perhaps that indisposition is removed.  Just as a builder does not will to 
bring together stones to form the structure of a house if they remain unhewn, so too it is 
with God.
29
            
Just as a stone’s being unhewn represents a disorder in relation to the ordered structure of the 
house that the wise builder wills to erect, so too a human’s opposing salvation and grace as a 
means to it disqualifies him for inclusion in the salvific edifice built by divine predestination.  
                                                          
28
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1, p. 1051. 
29
 Aquinas, Scriptum super I Sent. d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 4, p. 1052: Ad quartum dicendum, quod 
sapiens artifex non vult quod opus suum finem attingat nisi secundum rationem finis; si enim 
aliquam habeat contrariam dispositionem ad formam quam inducere intendit, non inducit in eo 
formam, nisi forte illa indispositione remota; sicut aedificator non vult quod lapides conveniant 
ad constitutionem domus ruditate in eis manente; et ita etiam est de Deo. 
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This analogy clearly indicates how an indisposition in the object willed can be a reason for the 
object’s rejection, though not a cause of willing on the part of the one who wills.  The builder 
wills, for whatever reason, to build an ordered house; it is only in light of a particular stone’s 
being unfit to contribute to that order that it is rejected.   
 Thomas continues and develops this line of thought in the second article of his sixth 
disputed question on truth, which asks “whether [God’s] foreknowledge of merits is a cause of or 
reason for predestination”.30  At the heart of the second objection is 1 Tim. 2:4 interpreted 
according to the antecedent/consequent will distinction.  It seems that divine foreknowledge of 
merits is a cause of predestination, the argument runs, because predestination necessarily 
includes both God’s antecedent and consequent will, the latter of which is “determined by us, 
insofar as we direct ourselves in various ways to meriting salvation or damnation”.31  The 
objection explicitly points out that if the divine will for human salvation included only the 
antecedent will, according to which God wills that all should be saved, as 1 Tim. 2:4 says, then it 
would follow that all would be predestined.  But Thomas has made clear in his opening article 
that not all are predestined, of course. 
 Thomas answers the question with great conceptual precision based on several nested 
distinctions.  The first and most important of these is that between eternal predestination itself 
and its twofold temporal effect, namely, grace and glory.  Only one of these effects, namely, 
glory, has meritorious human action as a cause, Thomas explains.  A human act in the mode of 
                                                          
30
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2. 
31
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 obj. 2: Sed voluntas consequens, ut dicit Damascenus [libro II 
Orthodoxae Fidei, cap. XXIX], est ex nostra causa, scilicet inquantum nos habemus vel 
damnationem. 
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merit cannot be a cause of grace, of course, since grace is the principle of good action oriented 
toward salvation and so merit itself is the effect of cooperating grace.
32
  Although “a certain 
natural disposition” (dispositio naturalis quaedam) prepares the human for receiving and making 
use of grace, “it does not follow from this,” Thomas maintains, “that our actions, whether 
preceding or following grace, are a cause of predestination itself”.33  On the cause of 
predestination itself, Thomas engages in a detailed discussion of the various ways that a certain 
will can be moved: either according to the mode of debt or duty (i.e., what one is obligated to 
do), or according to the mode of merit (i.e., what one deserves).  According to the mode of duty, 
a will is moved either absolutely (i.e., according to the ultimate end itself, which is the object of 
the will) or from something presupposed (i.e., when something requires some necessity in order 
to be the particular thing willed).  An example of one willing absolutely according to the mode of 
duty is a human who wills to be happy; no human is able not to will his own happiness, which is 
his duty or destiny qua human.  Thomas’s example of one who wills from something 
presupposed according to the mode of duty is a generous king who wishes to make a certain man 
a knight; because being a knight presupposes having a horse, the king is obliged to give a horse 
to the one whom he wills to knight.
34
  An instance of this kind of cause of willing in the case of 
God is His creation of a human being: because being a human presupposes having reason, when 
                                                          
32
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117); ST I-II.114, esp. a. 5; cf. ST I-II.109. 
33
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117): sed gratiae causa non potest esse actus 
humanus per modum meriti, sed dispositio naturalis quaedam, inquantum per actus 
praeparantur ad gratiae susceptionem.  Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod actus nostri, sive gratiam 
praecedant, sive sequantur, sint ipsius praedestinationis causa. 
34
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117). 
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God wills to make a human He is obliged to give him a rational soul.
35
  Strictly speaking, of 
course, God is never obliged to create any humans (just as the most generous king is never 
obliged to knight anyone), but once He freely wills to do so He is then ‘bound’ to will what 
being human presupposes.  Thomas is quick to point out that the perfection of grace and glory, 
which God wills for the predestined, is not a case of willing according to duty from something 
presupposed precisely because a human nature can be a human nature without this twofold 
perfection; indeed, such perfection is the supernatural end of the human, which by definition 
exceeds the limits of his natural powers.  Hence, for Thomas, “that God wills to give grace and 
glory to some particular [human] proceeds from [His] pure generosity”.36  And the cause of 
God’s willing things that proceed from His pure generosity alone is nothing other than “the 
superabundant love of the one willing toward the end, after which the perfection of goodness 
itself strives.  Hence the cause of predestination is nothing other than the goodness of God 
Himself.”37                        
 In this light, Thomas replies to the second objection by conceding that predestination 
does, in fact, include God’s consequent will, which in some way considers our part as humans.  
                                                          
35
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117). 
36
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117): Perfectio autem gratiae et gloriae sunt 
huiusmodi bona quod sine eis natura esse potest, excedunt enim naturalis virtutis limites; unde 
quod Deus velit alicui dare gratiam et gloriam, hoc ex mera liberalitate procedit. 
37
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 c (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117): In his autem quae ex liberalitate 
procedunt tantum, causa volendi est ipsa superabundans affectio volentis ad finem, in quo 
attenditur perfectio bonitatis ipsius.  Unde causa praedestinationis nihil est aliud quam bonitas 
ipsius Dei. 
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It looks to our part, however, not as inclining the divine will toward willing, but rather in that 
toward the production of which the divine will ordains grace: simply stated, it considers our role 
in meriting glory.
38
  And meritorious human action, as we have seen, may be said to be a cause 
of glory. 
 Our foregoing analysis has revealed how theologically sophisticated and carefully 
nuanced the early Aquinas was in reading 1 Tim. 2:4, particularly in light of the exegetical 
tradition he had received, stretching from the scriptural witness itself to Augustine and John 
Damascene through to Peter Lombard and Thomas’s own master, Albert the Great.  What 
Damascene’s influential distinction between antecedent and consequent will aims to capture is 
what Albert makes explicit when he affirms that predestination is an eternal, divine reality that 
has a relation to temporal, human realities: that is, it is the bimodal relation of God’s will to the 
human who will accept and make good use of grace, on the one hand, and to the human who will 
not, on the other.  Whereas God wills antecedently (in a unimodal way) that all humans should 
be saved, He wills consequently in a bimodal way based on foreknown merits.
39
  Aquinas makes 
clear, however, that foreknown merits are not a cause of eternal predestination itself, but rather 
merely of one of its temporal effects, namely, glory.  For Thomas, just as grace perfects nature, 
so too does nature cooperate with grace to merit the beatific end of God’s loving election.  God 
saves the human, but not without or in spite of the human himself, in Thomas’s view.  Glory is, 
after all, the human’s end, however super-natural it may be.  To return to Thomas’s example of 
the king who wishes to knight a man, but must—according to duty from something 
                                                          
38
 Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 6 a. 2 ad 2 (ed. Spiazzi, p. 117). 
39
 For Albert’s explanation, see his Comm. in I Sent. d. 40 a. 8, esp. ad 1 and ad 2, in B. Alberti 
Magni Opera Omnia, vol. 26, pp. 315-16. 
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presupposed—give him a horse in order to do so: even here, where the king is obligated to give 
what he gives in order to make what he wills, the knight is free to choose (at particular times, and 
even ultimately) not to ride the horse he has been given.  If he makes such a choice, he may not 
remain a knight, in Thomas’s view, but he does remain a human, with a will that may 
cooperate—or not—with what the king wills in knighting him.  Indeed, that he, by not riding his 
horse into battle, could choose to be once again simply a man rather than a proper knight 
demonstrates as much. 
 In conclusion, we might wonder what the young Aquinas’s reading of 1 Tim. 2:4 might 
contribute to modern Catholic discussions of the nature of salvation and the role of the human 
person in attaining to this end.  What role, if any, might his understanding play in helping us—
particularly in light of von Balthasar’s daring hope for universal salvation—to think through 
what it could mean that God wills that all should be saved?  In Thomas’s view, reading this verse 
as a statement indicating what God has done eternally—namely, predestine or save every 
individual human—would seem to undermine the freedom of the human in a way that renders 
him or her, as the object of salvation, neither an active participant in the process nor therefore 
truly human.
40
  Consequently, universal salvation would not be human salvation in any real 
sense.  It may seem ironic to us, but in Thomas’s view predestination, far from rendering us 
automatons, actually safeguards the human qua human and ensures that salvation is both an 
eternal, divine reality and a temporal, human one.  It guarantees not only that God does, in fact, 
                                                          
40
 For one contemporary consideration of these issues, see Ralph Martin, Will Many Be Saved? 
What Vatican II Actually Teaches and Its Implications for the New Evangelization (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), ch. 6, esp. Wainwright’s critique of von Balthasar’s position in n. 24 
on pp. 265-66. 
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will that all humans should be saved, but also that God’s will allows humans the freedom to will 
otherwise for themselves.    
